From revolutionary monolingualism to reactionary multilingualism: Top-down discourses of linguistic diversity in Europe, 1794-present

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ABSTRACT

Key documents in EU-level multilingualism policy since the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 reveal a number of paradoxes: the multiplicity of languages is seen as a problem or challenge to be overcome, while the diversity of languages is seen as a form of inherited cultural wealth. Comparing a policy document from 2007 with one from 1794, I show that such paradoxes are deeply entrenched in top-down European discourses about linguistic diversity dating back to the French Revolution. The dissolution of internal boundaries in today’s neoliberal EU has necessitated the fortification of the external boundary—that between Europe and elsewhere.

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1. Introduction

Diversity is good. If diversity is good, super-diversity should be even better—much better. And yet messages about linguistic diversity have a contradictory quality: if a lack of diversity is a bad thing, too much diversity can be bad, too. For the past twenty years or so, consumers of mass media have been repeatedly warned about a global crisis in linguistic diversity: every two weeks another language dies, usually in a remote and (until recently) unspoiled locale, when a superannuated last speaker passes away. Meanwhile, major cities (in Europe) seem rapidly to be filling up with people who speak a vast and unmanageable number of distinct and unintelligible (to us) languages, who insist on doing so, who persist in doing so—there goes the neighborhood. This suggests that distance may be a factor. Is linguistic (super-) diversity more easily appreciated from afar?

Probably it depends on who’s talking about it, and to whom they are talking. Diversity talk is a type of managerial discourse that can be encountered today in a wide range of institutional domains in the US, Europe, and elsewhere. Such discourses are organized around key terms and concepts that function as what Urciuoli has called strategically deployable shifters: these are terms whose conceptual content and whose reference to real-world objects—shifts in

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Vertovec 2007, 2010; see Blommaert and Rampton 2011 and references therein.

See Moore et al., 2010, p. 6 to get an idea of the growth in media coverage of “endangered languages.”

See Blommaert 2013.

I am indebted to Asif Agha (p.c.) for this apposite phrase.

Building on the work of Silverstein (1976), who built on the work of Jakobson (1990 [1957]); the term ‘shifter’ was coined (in English) by Jespersen (1922: 123–124).

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subtle but important ways, depending upon who is using them, when, where, to whom, and to what ends. ‘Language’ itself is obviously one of these shifters. ‘Diversity’ is another, ‘multilingualism’ another. ‘Multiculturalism’—the seemingly exhausted term that ‘super-diversity’ is meant to replace (Vertovec 2010)—certainly belongs here as well.

To say that these terms are ‘shifters’ is not to suggest that they are somehow inherently ambiguous (or worse, ‘polysemous’)––quite the opposite. It is merely to say that their meaning(s) can only be recovered by attending to the circumstances of their interested use. Like all indexical expressions, they not only reflect aspects of the contexts in which they are used, they help to create those contexts, in and by their very use. In that sense, they are the opposite of ambiguous: they are, as Peirce so memorably formulated it, compulsive (Peirce, 1958–1966: 2.305). The problem for analysis is that terms like ‘diversity’, ‘multilingualism’, and indeed ‘language’ itself compel our attention to different things on different occasions of use.

My primary focus here is on how diversity talk manifests itself in top-down discourses of linguistic diversity in contemporary Europe, specifically statements of policy and principle pertaining to European multilingualism that are articulated “at EU level”—i.e., those emanating from one or more of the three major institutions of the European Union (EU): the European Commission (EC), its executive branch; the Council of the European Union; and the European Parliament. I will argue that recent (post-2004) EU-level language and multilingualism policy represents a continuation and a further development of a very old European socio-political project, the one formerly known as language standardization. Indeed, as Susan Gal observes in a recent paper, contemporary EU language policies seem to be animated by language ideologies that are “strikingly similar to those developed by European nation-states over the last century and a half” (Gal, 2006: 22).

In this paper I show that these ideologies can be traced even further back, to the very dawn of European nation–state–hood. I will compare two very different kinds of texts from two very different periods in the history of European language policy: A decree addressed to all the citizens of France by the National Convention in Year II of the Revolution (1794), and a piece titled “How to Be a Good European Citizen” written in 2007 by a committee of literary eminences at the behest of the European Commission and addressed to a target audience that the online EU Bookshop labels “Specialised/Technical.”6

The 1794 Decree calls for the universal adoption of French by all citizens, and the annihilation and extirpation from French soil of all the forms of speech (“dialects,” patois, etc.) that diverge from the national standard. The 2007 policy proposal, written partly in response to the recent (2004, 2007) enlargements of the European Union (EU), celebrates linguistic diversity as an essential part of the European idea,” and proposes ways of promoting increased multilingualism among Europe’s citizens, all the while worrying how to reconcile support for “diversity of cultural expression” with “the need to assert the universality of essential values.”

These two texts, I will argue, provide two “snapshots” from very different periods of what it means to “see language like a State,” to borrow Silverstein’s phrase (this volume; cf. Scott, 1998). In both texts, ‘linguistic diversity’—understood as the multiplicity and intersection of distinct denotational codes—is seen as presenting problems by its very existence. In both texts, capital-L Languages are defined by contrast with their communicative Others—“dialects,” ‘jargons’, patois, lingua francas, etc.—and imagined as fully-equipped Standards, each with its own history and territory, writing system, literature, dictionaries, and above all, schools.

In both texts, the spectre of miscommunication—caused perhaps by speakers with less-than-perfect fluency in a/the Standard, and/or through their use of an inherently flawed verbal instrument—is viewed with undisguised horror, and is seen as a threat to governance and social cohesion. Both texts offer, inter alia, brief potted narratives of malaise, variously involving social chaos, feudal oppression, unfreedom (slavery), social disintegration, war and bloodshed, religiously motivated terrorism—narratives, in other words, of how bad things were “before” (the Revolution; the establishment of the EU), and/or of how bad things will be in the future, if the prescriptions contained herein are not followed. Most important of all, in both texts citizens are exhorted to make a free choice: to choose which communicative media (and, by implication, the communicative practices associated with them), and to “adopt” others. What emerges from the comparison is a remarkably consistent picture of what ‘linguistic diversity’ looks like when seen by a specifically European state (latterly, supra-state).

The ‘European project’ as currently constituted differs, of course, from earlier and more familiar language standardization efforts in that it attempts to encompass a multiplicity of European languages—the 28 official and working languages of the 28 EU member states, as well as the 60+ officially recognized “regional or minority” (and/or “lessor-used”) languages. EU policymakers have had rather less to say about the widespread use of English as a lingua franca, and the estimated 440+ “additional” languages currently being spoken across Europe by migrants from Asia, Africa, the Americas, and elsewhere. As will become clear, this is in part because they have had difficulty deciding whether these languages count as ‘European’ or not—or whether they count as ‘languages’ or not.

But there is no doubting that contemporary language policy elite in the EU are committed to the idea that ‘diversity’ is a good thing—the motto of the European Union, after all, is Unity in Diversity.7 The question is: what does their use of ‘diversity’ encompass and what does it elide, or erase? Consider the following, from a European Commission communication entitled Multilingualism: an Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment:

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7 For these numerical estimates, see the 2006 report of the VALEUR (Valuing All the Languages of Europe) Project of the Centre for European Modern Languages/Centre européen pour les langues vivantes, available at www.ecml.at/mtp2/valeur.
8 For translations into all 24 Official Languages, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motto_of_the_European_Union.
The harmonious co-existence of many languages in Europe is a powerful symbol of the European Union’s aspiration to be united in diversity, one of the cornerstones of the European project. Languages define personal identities, but are also part of a shared inheritance. They can serve as a bridge to other people and open access to other countries and cultures, promoting mutual understanding. A successful multilingualism policy can strengthen life chances of citizens: it may increase their employability, facilitate access to services and rights and contribute to solidarity through enhanced intercultural dialogue and social cohesion. Approach in this spirit, linguistic diversity can become a precious asset, increasingly so in today’s globalised world (European Commission, 2008b: 3).

Reading post-2004 EU language policy documents requires constant attention to the indexical function(s) of key terms that function as strategically deployable shifters—including of course the word ‘language’ itself. In the passage above, the term ‘language(s)’ is used first to index the (standardized, national) languages of the 24 EU member states (“many languages in Europe”), but then shifts its reference to index the concept of ‘Mother Tongue(s)’ (coupled with “personal identities” and “shared inheritance”). It shifts again in the third sentence, which points to the value (to European citizens) of learning a language other than one’s mother tongue: such languages, if learned, “can serve as a bridge to other people” by providing the individual with “access to other countries and cultures” (with “mutual understanding” as a collateral benefit). As the discussion shifts to enumerate the benefits of a successful multilingualism policy, ‘access’ occurs a second time, now in reference to a mainstay of EU language policy: the right of every citizen to communicate with EU-level institutions in his or her own (national, standard) language—‘linguistic diversity’ is imagined here as 24 monolingualisms—with “enhanced intercultural dialogue and social cohesion” again as add-ons. Finally, the linkage of ‘linguistic diversity’ with the key term ‘asset’ shows that the passage, like the document from which it comes (An Asset for Europe ...), speaks in (and as) the voice of EU-rape itself, conceived as a supra-national economic actor.

The opposite of ‘asset’ is of course ‘liability’. And indeed, it will turn out that, relevant to different kinds of framings found in the documents discussed below, the multiplicity of languages is seen as a problem (“challenge”; défi) to be overcome, but the diversity of languages is seen as a form of inherited cultural wealth.

My goal is to show that, while there are significant differences between standardization of the older kind (of a single common language for all the citizens of a single nation-state) and standardization of the newer kind (of multilingual repertoires for polyglot citizens across Europe), both projects are animated by the same framework of reasoning about language. As a framework of reasoning—a language ideology, in other words—it remains in most respects the very one described by Benedict Anderson (1983), evoking the dawn of ethnolinguistic nationalism in the modern period.9

1. Revolutionary monolingualism: France in 1794

On 4 June 1794 (16 Prairial II), the National Convention issued a decree to the French people that must rank as an early landmark in the history of language policy and planning in Europe.10 This decree, inviting the French people to speak (only) French, was presented on the same day as Abbé Henri Grégoire’s famous report “On the necessity and means to annihilate the patois and to universalize the use of the French language” (Rapport sur la Nécessité et les Moyens d’anéantir les Patois et d’universaliser l’Usage de la Langue française), which was the result of a four-year investigation that he undertook (in a way, the first sociolinguistic survey; see de Certeau et al. 1975; Aarsleff, 1982: 346–347).

“Citizens,” the decree begins—and consider the momentousness of this act of ritual performativity, conjuring into being a category of social existence and a collectivity of people as addressees, in the very act of Althusserian interpellation:

Citizens, you have the good fortune to be French, and yet many of you lack an essential element to merit fully this title. Some do not speak the national language at all, while others know it only imperfectly. There are entire departments where French almost never enters into the interactions of civil life. Nonetheless, the knowledge and the exclusive use of French are intimately linked to the maintenance of liberty, to the glory of the Republic, that is to say, your happiness, since its interests are your interests.11

Ignorance of the national language—or just “imperfect knowledge” of it—is a barrier to the liberty and happiness of citizens, and an impediment to the glory of the Republic. Indeed, the linguistic non-uniformity of the population leads to miscommunication and conflict within families: “Already among many the French language is used, while children of the same family are in this regard strangers to each other, friends and brothers can only speak to each other through interpreters.”12

9 See Silverstein, 2000 for a critique of Anderson; see Silverstein, 2010 on ‘logocracy’, and this volume, where it becomes “Locke-ocracy.”
10 I am indebted to Professor Douglas A. Kibbee (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) for sharing this document, and information related to it, with me; the English translation is his—my gratitude is recorded here. Needless to say, he is in no way responsible for the uses I have found for it. Professor Kibbee informs me (via email, 27 July 2011) that the document can be found in the Archives Parlementaires Vol 91, at pp. 318–326.
11 Citoyens, vous avez le bonheur d’être Français et cependant une faculté essentielle manque au grand nombre d’entre vous pour mériter ce titre dans toute son étendue. Les uns ignorent complètement la langue nationale; d’autres ne la connaissent qu’imparfaitement. Il est des départements entiers où presque jamais elle n’est admise dans le commerce de la vie civile. Néanmoins la connaissance et l’usage exclusif de la langue française sont intimement liés au maintien de la liberté, à l’agitation de la République, c’est-à-dire à votre bonheur, puisque ses intérêts sont les vôtres.
12 déjà chez plusieurs elle est usitée, tandis que les enfants de la même famille sont à cet égard étrangers les uns des autres; des amis et des frères ne peuvent se parler sans interprète.
This deficiency or lack, while it may be located in individual citizens, is both the result and the instrument of a long history of oppression:

Before the Revolution, France was divided into provinces that, for the most part, had different customs and different dialects. This disparity was, in the hands of despots, one more means to keep them under their thumb. The Revolution has united you around the homeland; there are no more provinces. Why then do thirty dialects that recall the names of those provinces still establish between you deadly divisions? 13

Having redrawn the map of France in a way that eliminated the provinces (as of 4 March 1790), the architects of the Republic hoped that they had eliminated the raison d’être for provincialisms in speech—another piece of performative magic by the new revolutionary state.

In many respects the decree is the originary text that lies behind Meillet’s famous doctrine of “le sentiment et la volonté de parler la même langue,” mentioned by Silverstein (this issue, p. 4):

Citizens, you detest political federalism, swear off linguistic federalism. Language should be like the Republic: from North to South, throughout French territory, the ways of speaking, like the hearts, must be in unison. 14

“Language uniformity,” notes Flaherty, “was viewed by Grégoire as a policy that could be introduced in conjunction with such measures as standardization of currencies, weights and measures, calendar reform, removal of internal trade barriers, and other forms of state centralization that were imposed during the Revolutionary period” (Flaherty, 1987: 321).

But language reform was even more important than these structural changes, Grégoire argued, for linguistic transfer [i.e., widespread language shift—RM] also involved an alteration in the consciousness of the political subject. Words, he stated, were “les liens de la société, et les dépositaires de toutes nos connaissances.” Thus, it followed that “l’imperfection des langues est une grande source d’erreurs.” With Condillac, Grégoire insisted that one could not “faire une raisonnement faux sans faire un solécisme” (Flaherty, 1987: 321). 15

In any case it is clear that the authors of the decree—of whom Grégoire must have been one—did not see language diversity as an asset for France:

These diverse dialects have gushed from the impure spring of feudalism. This fact alone should make them odious to you. They are the last ring in the chain with which tyranny bound you. Hurry to break it. Free men, put aside the language of slaves, to adopt the language of liberty. 16

It was perhaps the Jacobin leader Barère—for whom languages like Italian, German, Spanish and English were “little more than metonyms of corruption, feudalism, religious fanaticism, and mercantile tyranny, respectively” (Flaherty, 1987: 319)—who put the matter into a succinct and memorable form, in his Rapport sur les idiomes (of 8 pluvôise II):


Full mastery or command of the national language on the part of every citizen is the prerequisite for effective communication between citizens and the state. The only alternative that is envisioned is an unacceptable one: the provision of translation services would be both prohibitively expensive and ultimately ineffectual due to the inherent defects of the various ‘dialects’:

How will you be able to express your acceptance of laws, your love of these laws, your obedience to them, if the language in which they are written is unknown to you? Proposing to translate them would add to your expenses, and slow the progress of government. Moreover, most dialects lack the words necessary to make faithful translations. 18

13 Autrefois la France était divisée en provinces qui, pour la plupart, avaient des coutumes et des dialectes différents. Cette disparité était, entre les mains des despotes, un moyen de plus pour les tenir asservies. La Révolution vous a tous réunis autour de la patrie; il n’y a plus de provinces. Pourquoi donc 30 dialectes qui en rappellent le nom, établissent-ils encore entre vous une démarcation funeste?
14 Citoyens, vous détestez le fédéralisme politique, abjurez celui du langage. La langue doit être comme la République; du Nord au Midi, sur toute l’étendue du territoire français, il faut que les discours, comme les coeurs, soient à l’unisson.
15 Note that the conjunction here of ungrammaticality with bad (or false) reasoning antedates by about 150 years Benjamin Whorf’s conjunction of language-specific grammaticality with culture-specific forms of ‘habitual thought’.
16 Mais si la langue française ne vous est pas familière, qu’arrivera-t-il? Ces dialectes divers sont sortis de la source impure de la féodalité. Cette considération seule doit vous les rendre odieux; ils sont le dernier anneau de la chaîne que la tyrannie vous avait imposée; hâtez-vous de le briser. Hommes libres, quittez le langage des esclaves, pour adopter celui de la liberté.
17 Federalism and superstition speak Breton; emigration and hatred for the Republic speak German; the counter-Revolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque. Let us break these instruments of damage and error!
18 Comment pourrez-vous statuer sur l’acceptation des lois, les aimer, leur obéir et la langue dans laquelle elles sont écrites vous est inconnue? Proposer de la traduire, ce serait pour vous un surcroît de dépenses, ce serait ralentir la marche du gouvernement; d’ailleurs, la plupart des patois ont une indigence de mots qui ne comporte que des traductions infidèles.
Here the decree offers what I am calling a malaise narrative, casting it as a response to the question: “If the French language is not familiar to you, what will happen?”

Either you will perform badly in the functions to which your fellow citizens will name you; your weaknesses will betray their confidence, and will compromise the public good while dishonoring you. Or else your ignorance, recognized by others, will take votes away from you; offices will be constantly filled by a handful of people. Authority will be concentrated in their hands. And if, by misfortune, the habit of commanding gave them a taste for power, and their habits of business favored their looms, soon they would consider you a subordinate class, and the aristocracy thus revived would destroy equality.19

The same themes are reprised a few sentences later: “Among those who were accomplices of fanaticism and the aristocracy, there are many who were lead to this hell because their ignorance of the French language left them open (accès) to seduction.”20

Mastery of the national language must include the ability to read, speak, and write the standard; for those who do not come into that knowledge “naturally”—i.e., by a (happy) accident of birth—it can only be acquired through schooling, specifically, remedial instruction in formal institutions:

To read, write and speak the national language, that is the fundamental, indispensable knowledge. While foreigners study languages by principle, it would be humiliating for you to have, as your only guide, blind routine. Teachers have been trained to teach and spread the French language in departments where it is little known. Your representatives, whose heartfelt desire is to communicate directly with you, are preparing new means to enlighten the most isolated and backward hamlets. The citizens who live in them, are they not children of the fatherland? Thus ignorance, formerly the king’s instrument of crime, will henceforth be an individual’s crime.21

“In order to accomplish this immense task—the creation of a new ideological state subject by language—the promoters of francisation within the Jacobin government,” Flaherty observes, “looked to the school as the primary means of inculcating both the national language and the precepts of the Revolution itself, into the consciousness of its subjects” (Flaherty, 1987: 314).

The justification for linguistic unity changed between the monarchy and the Republic, but the desire for unity remained constant, as did the faith that sociopolitical cohesion could be achieved in and through the adoption of a single common language. Indeed, scholars such as Cerquiglini (1993) and Balibar (1985) have seen the emergence of Standard French as rooted in “a long-term project devised in Carolingian times to bring about the linguistic and political unity of the country” (Lodge, 2001: 281).22 But the final sentence of the preceding passage signals a fundamental shift: responsibility for any failure of the state’s effort to “enlighten the most isolated and backward hamlets” through the teaching of French must rest now with each individual citizen.

A multiplicity of ‘dialects’, each emblematic of a particular province and a particular set of cultural provincialisms, must be replaced by a single common language, which becomes—through its full, fluent, literate use by citizens—a performed emblem of the universality of citizenship within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. By territorializing the emblematic value of (the French) language, the whole of (French) ‘culture’ is territorialized as well—an absolutely central part of the ‘nation-building’ projects of the Enlightenment era (Anderson, 1983; Silverstein, 2000, 2010).

The decree was what we today would call an “aspirational” document. The policy goals it articulated were never realized. Indeed it was not until the early years of the Third Republic under the Education Minister Jules Ferry that “educational reforms standardizing the use of French” were instituted across the country (Flaherty, 1987: 312), by which time France “had been transformed by the advance of the capitalist mode of production over the preceding century” (Flaherty, 1987, p. 316). “The ideology of the bourgeois language reforms of 1880,” Flaherty observes, “incorporated much of the political rhetoric of 1793, while at the same time vitiating almost all of its revolutionary content” (Flaherty, 1987, 317).

19 Mais si la langue française ne vous est pas familière, qu’arrivera-t-il? Ou vous remploierez mal les fonctions auxquelles vous appelleront vos concitoyens; votre incapacité trompera leur confiance, et compromettra la chose publique en vous déshonorant; ou votre ignorance connue éloignera de vous les suffrages; alors les places seront constamment réparties entre un petit nombre de personnes; l’autorité se concentrera dans leurs mains; et si malheureusement l’habitude de commander leur en inspirait le goûit, l’habitude des affaires favoriserait leurs trames; bientôt ils vous considèreraient comme une classe subordonnée et l’aristocratie ressuscitée anéantirait l’égalité.

20 Parmi ceux qui ont été les complices du fanatisme et de l’aristocratie, il en est une foule qu’on n’a précipités dans cet abîme que parce que leur ignorance de la langue française donnait accès à la séduction.

21 Lire, écrire et parler la langue nationale, ce sont là les éléments des connaissances indispensables. Tandis que les étrangers l’étudient par principe, il serait humiliant pour vous de n’avoir pour guide à cet égard qu’une aveugle routine. Des maîtres ont été établis pour enseigner et propager la langue française dans les départements où elle est peu connue. Vos représentants, qui ont à cœur de communiquer immédiatement avec vous, préparent de nouveaux moyens pour éclairer les hameaux les plus ignorés. Les citoyens qui les habitent ne sont-ils pas les enfants de la patrie? Ainsi l’ignorance, qui était autrefois un instrument du crime des rois, serait désormais le crime des individus.

1.2. Reactionary multilingualism: Europe, 2007-present

Policymakers in the European Commission with responsibility for language and multilingualism obviously face challenges that were impossible to imagine in 1794. How they understand the nature of these challenges can be judged by the following list of bullet-points from the 2007 Final Report of the High Level Group on Multilingualism, a group of eleven senior European academics:

- the enlargements in 2004 and 2007, whereby the number of Member States has increased from 15 to 27;
- increasing recognition and seizure, by individuals and organizations, of opportunities provided by the Single Market, notably increasing trans-European trade, and mobility of workers;
- globalization and internationalization in many fields of human activity;
- revitalization of regions within Member States, and of cross-border regions;
- migration into the Union—to the extent that practically all the Member States are now migration countries;
- rampant developments in ICT, facilitating, among other things, instant communication from any place in the world to any other;
- creation of a European higher education and research area, including increasing student mobility;
- changing job profiles and increasing mobility between jobs;

Of the nine items on this list, all but the first (EU enlargements) and the fourth (revitalization of regions) explicitly concern mobility: mobility of workers within the EU Single Market, of migrants from elsewhere into the EU, of students, of tourists, and even of messages (“instant communication from any place in the world to any other”). If we consider that the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 showed once again that the boundaries of the EU were themselves mobile, and consider then the emphasis on “cross-border regions,” all nine are in a sense concerned with the problems and challenges brought about by mobility.

In June 2007 the European Commission assembled a “group of personalities active in the area of culture … to advise them on the role multilingualism could play in regard to the intercultural dialogue and the mutual comprehension of the citizens of the European Union” (European Commission, 2008a: 2). The group met in Brussels in June, October, and December of 2007. In January 2008, it released a report that, though entitled A Rewarding Challenge: How the Multiplicity of Languages Could Strengthen Europe,23 is often referred to as the Maalouf Report, after its chair. The Maalouf Report’s main proposals were later incorporated into the policy document quoted in the introduction above, Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment (European Commission, 2008b).

The Group of Intellectuals for Intercultural Dialogue, as it was officially known, was chaired by Amin Maalouf, a Beirut-born novelist resident in Paris since 1975 and the winner of the Prix Goncourt in 1993; Maalouf (b. 1949), whose mother was a Maronite Christian and whose father was Catholic, is the author of a number of books, including In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong (Maalouf, 2003).24 Other members were comparably distinguished in the realm of European belles lettres, and among them are other winners of major literary prizes, as well as philosophers, philanthropists, jurists and lawyers, novelists, and translators. Though their origins are impressively diverse—Lebanon, Germany, Romania, Italy, Portugal, England, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and Morocco are all represented—most were educated in Paris, London, and/or the US. All are presumably trilingual (at least) in their various mother tongues, as well as in major languages like French, German, and English.25

The Maalouf Report26 begins by identifying the need for the European Union to “manage this [linguistic] diversity effectively,” which means “facing issues that can no longer be sidestepped if the future is not to be jeopardized”:

How do we get so many different populations to live together in harmony, how do we give them a sense of a shared destiny and of belonging together? Should we be seeking to define a European identity? If so, can this identity take on

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24 The original French edition (Maalouf, 1998) was entitled Les Identités meurtrières.

25 Aside from Mr. Maalouf the other members were Jutta Limbach (b. 1934), a noted German jurist and the President of the Goethe Institut; Sandra Pralong (b. 1958), a Romanian-born communications consultant with advanced degrees from US universities and a distinguished career in the media (Newsweek, CNN and NGO spheres; Simonetta Agnello Hornby (b. 1945), a resident of London since 1972, described by the Independent (UK) as a “Sicilian aristocrat, Brixton children's lawyer, and bestselling novelist”; Eduardo Lourenço (b. 1923), a Portuguese critic, philosopher, and essayist who won the Camões Prize in 1996; Sir G. David Green (b. 1948), Chairman of the Darlington Hall Trust, former Secretary General of the British Council and former President of the European Union National Institutes of Culture; Jacques de Decker (b. 1945), a writer, essayist, and journalist and the permanent secretary of the Belgian Royal Academy of French Language and Literature; Jan Sokol (b. 1936), a philosopher and former Minister for Education of the Czech Republic, who translated Lévinas, Gadamer, Foucault, and Heidegger into Czech; Jens Christian Grøndahl (b. 1959), a Danish filmmaker who has published 13 novels; and Tahar Ben Jelloun (b. 1944), a Moroccan-born psychotherapist and novelist resident in Paris since 1971 who received the Prix Goncourt in 1987.

26 Since we are informed that the report was drafted by M. Maalouf (p. 2), I have occasionally interpolated (in square brackets) words and phrases from the French version of the Report.
board all our differences? Can it accommodate elements of non-European origin? Is respect for cultural differences compatible with the respect for fundamental values? (European Commission, 2008a: 3).

The “we vs. them” dichotomy is established from the first, setting “respect for cultural differences” in tension with “respect for fundamental [European] values.” Acknowledging that these are “very delicate issues” [questions éminemment delicats], the authors announce their intention to have it both ways: “in any human society linguistic, cultural, ethnic or religious diversity has both advantages and drawbacks,” they reason, and “the wise course is to … endeavor to maximize the positive effects and minimize the negative effects” (European Commission, 2008a, 3–4).

After suggesting that “efficient management of our linguistic, cultural and religious diversity” could produce “a reference model indispensable to a planet tragically afflicted [tragiquement affectée] by chaotic management of its own diversity” the authors state a series of “Principles”—but only after first pointing out that language diversity entails constraints; it weighs on the running of European Institutions and has its cost in terms of money and time. This cost could even become prohibitive if we wanted to give dozens of languages the rightful place which their speakers could legitimately wish for (European Commission, 2008a, p. 4).

Here begins the first of several “malaise narratives” in which are envisioned various dark futures that could come about if the current regime of linguistic diversity were to be left as it is. Here, that object of European linguistic and cultural anxiety—the English language—makes an appearance (note that the focus here is on multilingualism within EU-level institutions):

> Against this background, there is therefore a strong temptation to tolerate a de facto situation in which a single language, English, would be dominant in the work of European Institutions, in which two or three other languages would more or less manage to hold their own for a little longer, while the vast majority of our languages would have but a symbolic status and would hardly ever be used in joint meetings. A turn of events of this kind is not desirable. It would be damaging to the economic and strategic interests of our continent and all our citizens irrespective of their mother tongue. It would also be contrary to the whole ethos of the European project (European Commission, 2008a, pp. 4–5).

Having envisioned this negation of the “whole ethos of the European project,” the authors begin to enumerate their principles, as a disavowal of that negation. The first principle is “respect for our linguistic diversity”:

> While most of the European nations have been built on the platform of their language of identity, the European Union can only be built on a platform of linguistic diversity. This, from our point of view, is particularly comforting [réconfortant]. A common sense of belonging based on linguistic and cultural diversity is a powerful antidote [un puissant antidote] against the various types of fanaticism [fanatismes] towards which all too often the assertion of identity has slipped [ont souvent dérapé] in Europe and elsewhere, in previous years as today (European Commission, 2008a, p. 5). The metaphor of ‘slippage’ (here, into fanaticism) continues the previous reference to the risk of giving in to the “strong temptation” to tolerate a de facto situation in which English is dominant—except that it was “we Europeans” who were figured as subject to the temptations of English, and here it is clearly “elements of non-European origin” who are figured as in danger of slipping into fanaticism in the assertion of their (religious) identities, if they are not given the “powerful antidote” of “a common sense of belonging based on … diversity.”

In the next sentence the authors announce that the European Union—“born of the will of its diverse peoples”—“has neither the intention nor the ability to obliterate their diversity [gommer leur diversité].” This is apparently meant to be reassuring, but the need for explicit disavowal here signals that this possibility—the explicit goal of the 1794 Decree (and of the Abbé Gregoire’s Rapport), of course—was still in play.

The second principle enumerated in the report concerns “Europe’s identity,” and affirms that “each and every European, wherever he or she may live, wherever he or she may come from, must be able to access this heritage and recognize it as his or hers, without any arrogance but with a legitimate sense of pride” (European Commission, 2008a, p. 6). It also gestures towards a novel (sub-) grouping:

> Those entering Europe—and this could include people as diverse as immigrants, citizens of the new Member States, and young Europeans from all countries as they begin to discover life—must be encouraged … to gain acquaintance with the common heritage and … make their own contribution, too (pp. 6–7).

‘Europe’ in this passage is not a geographic designation, nor a political one—this is Europe viewed as a ‘project’. The third principle evokes an essential tension between the need to “encourage the diversity of cultural expression” and the need to “assert the universality of essential values” (p. 7). Acknowledging that “it is never easy to accurately or exhaustively pinpoint those values to which everyone should adhere,” the authors assert that “this lack of precision … does not mean we have to resign ourselves to relativism when it comes to fundamental values” (European Commission, 2008a). They come up with a list of four such values: “Upholding the dignity of human beings, men, women, and children, sticking up for one’s physical and moral integrity, halting the deterioration of our natural environment, [and] rejecting all forms of humiliation and unjustified discrimination on the grounds of color, religion, language, ethnic origin, gender, age, disability, etc.” These, then, are values “on which there must be no compromise in the name of any specific cultural feature.”
Having identified some of the problems, the report moves now to lay out a solution, which takes the form of a proposed reorganization of the multilingual repertoire of an (ideal) European citizen of the future. This person would have perfect fluency and literacy in three languages: first, in his or her own “mother tongue”; second, in the (standardized, official) language of another EU member state or community, termed a “personal adoptive language” (langue personnelle adoptive); and third, in a “language of international communication.”

The report emphasizes the importance of two ideas, “which are in fact the two sides of one proposal”: first, bilateral relations between the peoples of the EU, which “should hinge by way of priority on the languages of the two peoples involved rather than another language” (European Commission, 2008a, p. 9). Second, they stress the importance of the idea of the personal adoptive language as the communication medium through which such bilateral relations between citizens of different EU member states can be sustained—though they never specify how this would work, in terms of any actual forms of discursive practice. “The idea is that every European should be encouraged to freely choose a distinctive language, different from his or her language of identity, and also different from his or her language of international communication” (European Commission, 2008a, p. 10; emphasis in orig.). The personal adoptive language, they stress, “would in no way be a second foreign language but, rather, a sort of second mother tongue” (European Commission, 2008a).

For Europeans, the acquisition of perfect (spoken and written) fluency in their freely chosen personal adoptive language “would go hand in hand with familiarity with the country/countries in which that language is used, along with the literature, culture, society and history linked with that language and its speakers” (European Commission, 2008a, p. 10).28 Note that the personal adoptive language of any given individual European, in this scenario, would by definition be the mother tongue of the citizens of some other EU member state: the repertoire is being constructed as composed of an “I-code” (the mother tongue of any individual) and a “you-code” (the same person’s personal adoptive language). This “bilateral” relationship means that my “I-code” (mother tongue) is your “you-code” (personal adoptive language), and vice-versa: the exact image of a ‘shifter’ in the technical sense (Jespersen, 1922:123–124, Jakobson, 1990 [1957], Silverstein, 1976)!

On 24 March 2009, the European Parliament reaffirmed the goal articulated here and in other documents, that “Europeans should speak their mother tongue plus two other languages, one for business and one for pleasure” (EurActiv 25 March 2009). Note how this proposed intervention into the linguistic repertoires of European citizens of the future would preserve the neoliberal doctrine that the market economy operates independently of culture: “By drawing a clear distinction, when the choice is made, between a language of international communication and a personal adoptive language,” the authors of the Maalouf Report write, “we would encourage Europeans to take two separate decisions when it comes to language learning, one dictated by the needs of the broadest possible communication, and the other guided by a whole host of personal reasons stemming from individual or family background, emotional ties, professional interest, cultural preferences, intellectual curiosity, to name but a few” (European Commission, 2008a, p. 11).

The authors enumerate four ways in which the adoption of their proposal will bring benefits to Europe and to Europeans. First, the learning of a personal adoptive language—and all the culture that it transmits—can bring the learner both “enormous professional, intellectual, and emotional satisfactions” and a general sense of personal fulfillment [épanouissement] (European Commission, 2008a, p. 14); such learning is also “conducive to a more outward-looking attitude to the world and others” (European Commission, 2008a). There is a Bildungsroman narrative lurking here: the focus seems to be on cultivating the sensibilities of young people. Second, by “underlining the bilateral nature of linguistic relations between the different countries of Europe, the proposal would “have a positive impact on the quality of relations between Europeans, individuals and peoples alike” (European Commission, 2008a, 16).

Here follows another malaise narrative:

Despite the efforts of certain leading founder countries, such as France or Germany, we are witnessing an erosion [effritement] of the level of knowledge of the neighbor’s language in favor of a language of international communication, which is deemed to be more useful. If we are to reverse this seemingly inexorable trend we have to make a clean break [l’on rompe radicalement] with the traditional logic behind language learning, by making a clear distinction between the two choices to be made, one depending on the international status of a language, and the other, that of the personal adoptive language, based on completely different criteria … By allowing people not to have to choose between utilitarian considerations and cultural affinity, we would restore a powerful motivation to learn every European language (European Commission, 2008a, p. 17; emphasis in orig.).

The last sentence of this passage will be confusing to anyone who has followed the report this far, since it seemed quite clear that people were being exhorted exactly to choose to learn (via formal instruction) two languages in addition to their mother tongue, one based on “cultural affinity” (the personal adoptive language), the other based on “utilitarian considerations” (the language of international communication).

27 Similar kinds of “three-language formulas” have been proposed and/or implemented in a number of societies, most notably in India (at the behest of Jawaharal Nehru—see Aggarwal, 1991, Brass, 1975, and refs. therein) and Africa (see Laitin, 1992, and see the critical response of Akinnaso, 1994); see Fishman 1999: 90ff for an overview, and Ferguson 1971 [1966] for an early attempt at developing “sociolinguistic profile formulas.”

28 A scenario reminiscent of the Wanderjahr or international residence of the cosmopolitan elites of traditional upper-middle-class consciousness, but perhaps more directly modeled on intra-EU exchange programs for university students like Erasmus (an acronym: European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students).
Another member of the Group of Intellectuals for Intercultural Dialogue, Sandra Pralong, provided further detail—and introduced further ambiguities—in a press release tied to the official launch of the Maalouf Report:

Explaining the reasoning behind the ‘personal adoptive language’ concept, Sandra Pralong, a member of the High Level Group of Intellectuals on Multilingualism, outlined her vision of “a patchwork of bilateral relations stitching Europe together,” whereby pockets of citizens in each country would learn different languages until all the bloc’s tongues are covered, eliminating the need for a common third one such as English or French (EurActiv 15 Sept 2008).

The position of the third “language of international communication” in this imagined “mother-tongue–plus-two” repertoire is particularly delicate, because here is where anxieties about lingua franca English—or any other lingua franca—come to the fore. The authors stress that bilateral relations between citizens in different European countries “would be considerably enhanced if everyone could express themselves in a language they are perfectly fluent in, either their own or that of their partner, rather than, as so often happens nowadays, through the medium of a third language in which they lack that fluency” (European Commission, 2008a, p. 16; emphasis added).

One of the key features of this discourse (and that of the 1794 Decree) is a certain horror in the face of dysfluencies, “partial” or “truncated” forms of linguistic competence (cf. Blommaert et al. 2005), and by implication, non-standard usages generally. This horror is based on a language-ideological narrative in which less-than-perfect fluency in the individual speaker leads to flawed or imperfect expression (solecisms), which in turn leads to interpersonal misunderstanding and miscommunication, which can then have a negative impact on social cohesion.

The fourth way in which Europe would benefit from adopting the Maalouf Report’s prescription develops further the horror-narrative of putative dysfluency as a threat to European social cohesion. “Our group long pondered,” the authors write, “the problem of preventing cultural diversity from having a negative impact on harmonious coexistence within European societies” (European Commission, 2008a, p. 19). The topic here, at last, is immigration: “simultaneously a source of enrichment but also a source of tension.” The proposal here is that

For immigrants, the personal adoptive language should in the normal run of events [en règle générale] be that of the country in which they have chosen to live. A thorough knowledge of the language and the culture it carries with it is essential if they are to integrate into the host society (p. 19).

And yet there is a place for their non-European “mother-tongues” after they have come to live in Europe, and perhaps have become (legal) citizens. That place is in the home:

It is vital for the countries of Europe to understand how important it is for every immigrant or person originating from immigration, to maintain knowledge of their language of origin. A young person who loses the language of his ancestors also loses his ability to communicate effortlessly with his parents and that is a factor of social dysfunctionalism which can lead to violence (p. 20).

Notice the emphasis placed on “the ability to communicate effortlessly,” and the conflict that emerges from its lack, now a conflict between generations within immigrant families (or, families of “persons originating from immigration,” whatever that may mean). Another malaise narrative unfolds in the form of a just-so story:

Excessive assertion of identity often stems from a feeling of guilt in relation to one’s culture of origin, a guilt which is sometimes expressed by exacerbated religion-based reactions. To describe it differently, the immigrant or a person whose origins lie in immigration and is able to speak his mother tongue and would be able to teach it to his children, knowing that his language and culture of origin are respected in the host society, would have less need to assuage his thirst for identity in another way (p. 20).

The presence of circumlocutions and heavy noun-phrases like “exacerbated religion-based reactions” suggests a pervasive anxiety in the authorial voice. “To allow migrants, European and non-European alike, to gain access easily in their language of origin and allow them to maintain what we could term their linguistic and cultural dignity, to us once again seems a powerful antidote against fanaticism” (European Commission, 2008a). Such measures would “allow” migrants to develop a sense of “linguistic and cultural belonging, not at the expense of religion but at the expense of identity-oriented use of religion, and could help reduce tension in our European societies as in the rest of the world” (European Commission, 2008a, p. 21).

The remainder of the Maalouf Report is taken up with sketching possible institutions, foundations, associations, committees and other “bilateral and bilingual organizations” of the future, “sister city” programs, and so forth. There is a single concrete proposal at the end of the report, however, and this comes in a discussion of the use of technology to support the learning of personal adoptive languages: a synchronized time-table for the distance-learning of these languages via online courses.

It no doubt presupposes standardization of timetables so that the same segments can be devoted to language learning in several countries at the same time. Within these timetables, every European student would connect to his own course in Greek, Dutch, Romanian, Estonian, etc. We are convinced that these common timetables would themselves generate their own eminently advantageous dynamic in terms of knowledge, individual fulfillment, and citizenship, particularly if they were spread across the whole of Europe (p. 27).

Like the 1794 Decree, the Maalouf Report is an “aspirational” document. Like the French Republic in 1794, the EU today has neither the financial resources nor the authority to put any of the recommendations of the Maalouf Report into practice. EU-level
institutions cannot intervene in the language policies of Member States—to do so would violate their sovereignty, and is forbidden under the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in EU law since the Maastricht Treaty (and strengthened under Lisbon).29

2. Conclusion

The political economic, sociodemographic, and cultural conditions that obtain in the EU today are of course radically different to those that obtained within France in 1794. In their propositional content, in their evaluation of whether linguistic diversity is a bad thing (1794) or a good thing (2007), the two texts discussed here are diametrically opposed. And yet in viewing linguistic diversity through a single lens—that of the language community, as distinct from the speech community (Silverstein, this volume, and refs. there)—the two texts are actually operating within a single frame of reference:

(1) In both, evident facts of sociolinguistic variation are conceptualized as deviations from the “normal” state of linguistic affairs, in which each polity is assumed to be composed of citizens who uniformly pledge (and perform) allegiance to a single set of denotational norms, those associated with the national standard language, full knowledge of which (including literacy and numeracy) is universalized within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. The 1794 Decree summons the citizens of France to re-organize their own linguistic repertoires to conform to this image, while the 2007 Maalouf Report seeks to safeguard the standard sociolinguistic imaginary against invasions from without (e.g., *lingua franca* English, immigrant languages), by summoning European citizens to re-organize their own, now multilingual, repertoires.

(2) Both the 1794 Decree and the 2007 Maalouf Report have much to say about languages as emblems of culture and tradition, but very little to say about the actual use of language in actual communicative practices. Imagining an ideal EU of the future, the authors of the Maalouf Report provide extended description of how they would like to see knowledge of (European) languages distributed among European citizens of the future, but very little about how these future Europeans would actually be using the languages they know.

(3) There is clear commonality in the way the two documents conceptualize a constitutive Other to set against the desired sociolinguistic regime. In the 1794 Decree, the term *patois* (and sometimes *dialect*) is used as a covering label encompassing a heterogeneous set of linguistic registers—what modern linguists would call dialects, as well as languages—arrayed in opposition to, and outside of, the Standard (*langue*). The continued use of *patois* perpetuates feudal divisions, leads to misunderstanding between people from different regions and occupational groups, even within families, and above all poses a threat to effortless communication between citizens and the state. The various *patois* occupy a position in the rhetorical structure of the 1794 Decree that is occupied in the Maalouf Report by a similarly heterogeneous set of linguistic practices and registers (albeit un-labeled). Here again we find ‘foreign languages’ lumped together with phenomena of very different kinds: dysfluency and/or an “accent” in the standard language; imperfect fluency in (any) standard language; practices of “language mixing”; imperfect transmission of mother tongues within families—all of which are seen, again, to entail miscommunication and (“cultural”) misunderstanding among and between Europe’s diverse citizens, and to threaten the effectiveness of communication between state and citizen.

In 1794, revolutionary monolingualism called for the universalization of French and the annihilation of the *patois* (within France); in 2007, reactionary multilingualism calls for the universalization of a specific kind of multilingual speaker repertoire, the “mother-tongue-plus-two” formula (within the EU). In contemporary EU policy discourse, this plan is presented as a familiar kind of “win-win” scenario: universalization of the trilingual repertoire will primarily serve economic goals—by supporting the reskilling of European workers with flexibility to meet the demands of an export-driven Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE), and supporting the overall integration of the EU labor market—with social cohesion and better intercultural understanding as added benefits (see Gal, 2012: 33 et passim).

If in 1794 the project was to promote (enforce) the use of French as the emblem and instrument of republican identity, by the late 2000s it became possible to “proclaim that the use of French is a defence against linguistic homogeneity,” and “rather incredibly,” to place the French language “among the victims of linguistic oppression, conveniently ignoring the legacy of the ‘civilising mission’ that France and Belgium undertook in their colonies” (Kibbee, 2004: 49).

It will be recalled that for Grégoire, Barère, and the other architects of the French Republic, “language uniformity was viewed ... as a policy that could be introduced in conjunction with such measures as standardization of currencies, weights and measures, calendar reform,” and “removal of internal trade barriers” (Flaherty, 1987: 321). This last eventually became a reality at EU level with the creation of the Schengen area.30 The Schengen Area, according to the website of the European

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29 And so many EU Member States pursue ever more exclusionary, ever more punitive language policies: see Spotti (2011) for a discussion of recent developments in the Netherlands; Milani (2007) for a report from Sweden; Weber and Homer (2010) for an ethnography of ‘Orwellian doublethink’ in Luxembourgish schools; Stotz (2006) for a discussion of *Sprachenstreit* (‘language strife’) in Switzerland; and see Hogan-Brun et al. (2009) and Van Oers et al. (2010).

30 First established by a 1985 agreement between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany, then incorporated into EU law with Amsterdam treaty of 1999, and now encompassing 26 European countries, roughly 400 million people, and 4,312,099 square kilometers (1,664,911 square miles) of land.
Commission’s Directorate General for Home Affairs, is “one of the greatest achievements of the EU. It is an area without internal borders, an area within which citizens, many non-EU nationals, business people and tourists can freely circulate without being subjected to border checks.”

In promoting the “mother-tongue-plus-two” multilingual repertoire (aka the Barcelona Objective), the authors of the Maalouf Report may have intended in part to promote the “Schengenisation” (Driessen, 1996, 1998) of the European “linguistic market.” And yet this has not really involved a relaxation of the (Europe-) internal boundaries between languages—and the Maalouf Report promotes no such thing. Rather, Schengenisation has entailed the re-organization, or—to use Susan Gal’s felicitous phrase, the re-stratification—of multilingual speaker repertoires in Europe (Gal, 2012: 25; cf. Heller and Duchêne, 2012). More importantly, Schengenisation has had the same entailments in the linguistic realm as it has had in the political economy of European biopower more broadly: the dissolution of internal “trade barriers” has necessitated the strengthening of the outermost external boundary, that between the EU and elsewhere.

And isn’t this just the issue in EU-level language policy discourse? If something called ‘Europe’ is imagined as a certain kind of multilingual polity, possessed of a certain kind of “linguistic diversity”—the kind that is worth preserving—then threats to this image of European multilingual orderliness come from outside, in three forms: (1) English as a lingua franca of “international communication”; (2) non-EU immigrant languages; and (3) languages that straddle or overflow the territorial boundaries of EU member states (e.g., Basque; lingua franca Russian in parts of Eastern Europe).

And so the theme of mobility, mentioned earlier in this article, makes its return. Mobility disrupts the essential link between language and territory. Mother tongues and minority-language enclaves encompassed within nation-states are territorialized by definition, and it is the Herderian connection between (a) language and (a national) territory that confers on them their emblematic value. Transterritorial minority languages like Basque are problematic because they violate this link between language and national symbolism; deterritorialized languages such Romani, Yiddish, and lingua franca English raise a different set of problems, because they do not suggest any link with any national territory. In his tenure as EU Commissioner for Multilingualism (2007–2010), the Rumanian economist Leonard Orban made clear his view that “promoting a lingua franca is intrinsically against the Commission mandate: promoting linguistic diversity.” The task of his commission, Mr. Orban asserted, is “protection of the present linguistic environment, to consolidate each citizen’s right to communicate and make oneself understood in his or her mother tongue.”

Some commentators have compared post-Schengen Europe to a fortress (e.g., Folliis, 2013; Geddes, 2000). Others have likened it to a maze—a construction that manages to keep some out, some in and most confused as to their precise whereabouts” (Christiansen and Jørgensen 2000: 74)—and still others to a gated community (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007; Zaiotti, 2007). Even a brief examination of official discourses about language diversity in Europe—primarily those emanating from the European Commission (EC)—reveals Enlightenment-era understandings of ‘language diversity’ being stretched to the breaking point under contemporary socioeconomic conditions, conditions that themselves have largely been brought about by these same supra-national institutions of governance. Throughout these documents one observes a striking mismatch between the language ideologies (concepts of language and of linguistic diversity) that enjoy hegemonic status within EU institutions, and the socioeconomic transformations that those same institutions have helped to set into motion.

It is in this respect that the contemporary phase of policy formation around multilingualism (i.e., after the EU enlargements of 2004) should be seen as reactionary: policymakers are reacting to the very kinds of forces identified in recent literature with ‘super-diversity’ and/or ‘polylanguaging’ (Blommaert and Rampton, 2011; Jørgensen et al. 2011). They are struggling to manage contemporary transformations of linguistic communities within, across, and beyond the boundaries of Europe, but doing so well after those transformations were already underway, after their effects were already everywhere to be seen (e.g., Blommaert, 2013) and heard (e.g., Rampton, 2006, 2011) within Europe itself. As the Swiss playwright Max Frisch famously quipped in 1965: “We asked for workers; human beings came instead.”

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32 Recall that “the major stumbling block to the progress of [the] new discursive community” imagined by the leaders of the French Revolution was “the stubborn tenacity of the oral folk culture, the patois realm that defined the borders of the Revolution and separated one ‘France’ from the ‘other’. . . In the same way, the central axis of Grégoire’s own discourse, for example, turns on the opposition France/étranger” (Flaherty, 1987: 324).
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